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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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IS OUR CHINA POLICY CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS OF PACIFIC WAR?

THE blows now raining on Japan from many directions are portents of ultimate disintegration, similar to that facing the Nazis in the West. In recent weeks American forces have made significant advances on Okinawa, the British Navy has stepped up its Far Eastern operations, Moscow has deprived Japan of the consolation of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, the Koiso régime has fallen and given way to the Suzuki cabinet, American planes have sunk the 45,000-ton battleship *Yamato*, and General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz have been placed in command, respectively, of all American Army and Navy forces in the Pacific. This chain of unbroken Japanese misfortunes is a symbol of Japan's decline as a military power and of greater defeats ahead.

END OF A TREATY. Of all these events, Soviet denunciation of the neutrality pact with Japan means most to the American public, for this country has long looked toward the time when our Russian allies would be able to show their solidarity with us in the East. Now Moscow has served notice on Tokyo that the pact "has lost its sense" and its prolongation is "impossible." The grounds given by the Russians—that Japan has aided Germany against the U.S.S.R. and has waged war with the latter's allies, the United States and Britain—clearly could be used to justify Soviet entrance into the Far Eastern conflict without waiting for the expiration of the treaty in April 1946.

Yet the American public should not expect the Soviet Union to fight Japan at an early date, unless Tokyo undertakes the desperate, fatal gamble of striking first. It is true that the end of the European war is in sight, but it is not yet here. Moreover, after bearing the main brunt of Nazi might and losing millions of men in the process, the Russians may be expected, at least, to wait until the main body of Tokyo's armies has been tied down by the forces of the other United Nations. It is also possible that

Moscow will concentrate on various important measures short of war, for example, making bases available to the United States.

The likelihood that the U.S.S.R. will aid us against Japan in no way lessens our own military responsibilities. In fact, it has now become more urgent for us to help create the conditions under which the Russians can participate at the earliest moment. It must at the same time be recognized that denunciation of the neutrality pact has valuable immediate effects. It establishes a more favorable atmosphere for the San Francisco Conference, obliges Japan to maintain or even increase its forces in Manchuria and Korea, and undoubtedly has greatly heightened the tension and gloom already existing in Tokyo.

FUTURE OF MANCHURIA. Yet questions have been raised about Moscow's intentions in Manchuria, whose return to China was pledged by the United States and Britain at the Cairo Conference in November 1943. There is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. desires to annex Manchuria or that it does not wish to see that territory become part of a friendly, stable China. But that the Russians will exert an important influence on the future of Manchuria, in which they have a deep security interest, is no more open to question than that America will help to shape the future of neighboring countries or of areas in which we have troops.

A glance at the situation in China will show Manchuria's explosive potentialities. At the present moment the only Chinese resistance forces in or near the area are those of the Communist-led Eighteenth Group Army. If the Russians should later fight on Manchurian soil or in north China, they would come in contact with these troops and cooperate with them against Japan. The effect would be to strengthen the Eighteenth Group Army militarily and politically. If, before this happened, Chungking and the Com-

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munists had reached an agreement on unity, the Russians would simply be in the position of rendering aid to the local forces of a united China. But if an adjustment of Chinese internal differences had not been achieved, grave issues could be raised both for Chungking and Washington.

OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA. The American public does not know whether the U.S.S.R. will use troops against Japan, but such aid would undoubtedly be welcomed both on Main Street and in Washington. Clearly, to expect the Russians to fight Japan without influencing the areas they enter is to ask of Moscow something that we do not ask of ourselves—something that is in any event a political impossibility. For, even if the Russians do not enter Manchuria, their voice will still be heard in that region. Consequently, the only practical approach for the United States is to accept the influence of the U.S.S.R. in northeast Asia as a fact and to seek to anticipate concrete problems, so that they may be prevented from arising or may be adjusted satisfactorily when they appear.

Under General Stilwell and our former Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, it was American policy to exert strong pressure on Chungking for internal Chinese unity, and to establish direct contact with the Chinese guerrilla armies while cooperating to the full with the government and armed forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This approach rested on the conviction that it would be of great mili-

tary value to help the Chinese guerrillas step up their war effort, especially since we would be working with them if we landed at certain points on the China coast. It was also felt that amicable American-Soviet and American-Chinese relations required that greater Chinese unity be achieved before the final phases of the Far Eastern war.

Recently a different tendency has found expression in some sectors of American policy toward China. For example, in an interview of April 2 in Washington, Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley declared that the United States would confine its assistance entirely to Chungking and give no supplies to the Chinese Communists. If such a policy were actually carried out, it would mean that we had decided, for political reasons, to forego the important military aid the guerrilla armies can furnish. It would also be inconsistent with our interest in having the Russians fight the Japanese, since we would be in the position of encouraging the Russians to come in contact with the guerrillas whom we refused to aid.

That such a tendency can long survive is open to doubt. The Gauss-Stilwell policy, despite the obstacles it came up against, was a more realistic approach to China's problems. It was a policy that promised—in so far as control of events lay in our power—to make maximum use of all Chinese armed forces in the war against Japan, and to lay a sound basis for cooperation with both China and Russia in war and peace.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF RUSSIA'S SECURITY PROGRAM

Russia's denunciation of its neutrality pact with Japan has caused renewed discussion of Moscow's foreign policy among those who, since Yalta, had expressed growing doubts about the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to cooperate with the Western powers. For many Americans Russia's eventual participation in the Pacific war has become a primary test of its good faith. Yet no sooner does Moscow take a step in that direction than voices are heard declaring that the U.S.S.R. has designs on areas of Asia adjacent to its borders.

RUSSIA'S COURSE CLOSELY WATCHED. Whatever Russia does or fails to do, its actions or lack of them are suspect to other countries. When the Red Army was racing toward Berlin, many Americans were worried that the Russians would get dangerously ahead of their Western allies. Now that the Russian forces are concentrating on the occupation of Vienna, the same people wonder why the Red Army has slowed down its drive toward Berlin. Suspicions are always voiced about the motives of great powers. The French, for example, have shown unmistakable anxiety concerning the ultimate objectives of the United States in Africa and Asia, where France has colonial interests.

But there are special reasons for the recurring anxiety about Russia's objectives in Europe. The fact that the U.S.S.R. is ruled by a political dictatorship dominated by the Communist party, which has not hesitated to repress by force opposition elements both within its borders and within those of countries it has helped to liberate from German rule; the existence in Russia of a social and economic system that challenges the system of private enterprise familiar to advanced Western countries; the absence of civil liberties associated with Western democracy; the hostile attitude of the Soviet government, until recently, toward organized religion, and its continuing strictures on the policy of the Vatican—all these factors have influenced the judgment of other countries about Russia's foreign policy. None of these factors can be disregarded. The primary question since Russia's invasion by Germany in 1941, however, has been not whether Russia would adopt the political and economic institutions of Britain and the United States, but whether it would continue to fight the Germans and, once a common victory had been achieved, would participate in the establishment of an effective international organization that could prevent another global war in the future. This question

has lost none of its urgency. Can it be answered with any degree of assurance on the eve of the San Francisco Conference?

SECURITY MOSCOW'S CHIEF AIM. What can be said is that the U.S.S.R. is just as determined to achieve security as the United States or any other country. It has suffered enormous losses in manpower and material resources, far in excess of the United States and, relatively speaking, of Britain. It intends to repair these losses as swiftly as possible, and to prevent their recurrence by all means at its disposal. Among these means is participation in a strong international organization.

The Soviet government, when it accepted the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, apparently assumed that these proposals would be accepted by other nations without fundamental changes. Public discussion of controversial political questions is not as yet practical in the U.S.S.R. It requires a major adjustment on the part of the Soviet government to lend itself to such discussion on the life-and-death matter of Russia's post-war security. Yet the more the Russians participate in international conferences, the more they become aware of the views of peoples outside their borders, the better is the prospect for ultimately finding a common ground for cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the other United Nations.

An international security organization, however,

will not of itself answer many questions which Russia, like other nations, is asking about the future. Russia wants access to seaways and world markets; it wants stability in countries along its western border; above all, it wants to make Germany incapable of embarking on another war of aggression, by depriving the Germans of military power, and diverting their resources of labor and technical skill to the reconstruction of its devastated areas. This is what might be called Russia's minimum program. At the same time, its military leaders, fresh from spectacular victories on the battlefield, want as much strategic protection for Russia on the west as it will be politically feasible to achieve; and nationalists in the Soviet government are in sympathy with this aim. Geographic proximity, military power, and similarities of economic and social problems, have already given Russia great influence in countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This influence will spread westward only if the United States and Britain fail to assume their share of political responsibility in Europe, falter in their announced determination to establish an effective international organization, and find it impossible to agree with Russia about the treatment of Germany.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third in a series of articles on political trends in Europe on the eve of San Francisco.)

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Many a Watchful Night, by John Mason Brown. New York, Whittlesey House, 1944. \$2.75

Despite some critics' tendency to disparage the use of beautiful words in describing war experiences as if detracting from understanding, the author again demonstrates that a person with real feeling for language can interpret battle drama sympathetically to men below decks and the the reading public.

Rendezvous with Destiny, edited by J. B. S. Hardman. New York, Dryden Press, 1944. \$3.00

A selective arrangement of addresses and opinions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

What will United Nations delegates discuss at the historic April 25 meeting? Read

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Education in Transition, by H. C. Dent. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$3.00

This analysis of English education as affected by the war should be of value to those interested in post-war education in any country.

Atlas of Global Geography, by Erwin Raisz. New York, Global Press, distributed by Harper and Brothers, 1944. \$3.50

Developed on the interesting idea of "the plane's-eye view" and the theory that a global map would fit a globe if wrapped around it. The Global Press distributes directly a wall map, the Trans-Orbal Map at \$1.00.

The Land of Prester John, by Elaine Sanceau. New York, Knopf, 1944. \$2.75

As fabulous and fascinating as Marco Polo's journey, this vividly written tale tells of the courage of Portuguese Jesuits and men of arms, whose work in Ethiopia continued for almost two hundred years.

Nationality in History and Politics, by Frederick Hertz. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$6.50


The author considers national consciousness as the sum of many aspirations toward national personality. He treats these aspirations in their relation to the various factors in the background of modern nationalism and carefully brings out the effect of the doctrines of great thinkers on national ideology.

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Washington News Letter



COLONIAL ISSUE RAISED ON EVE OF SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

The dependent peoples of the world have a direct stake in the United Nations conference which opens on April 25 at San Francisco. The meeting is expected to create machinery for the transfer of World War I mandates from the League of Nations to the new world organization, and the United States may propose, or at least support, an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that would directly authorize the General Assembly to consider problems relating to colonial areas other than mandates. Discussion about any particular region, like Palestine in reference to mandates or Indo-China in reference to colonies, would violate the purpose of the Conference which has been convoked to establish the machinery to deal with problems affecting world affairs. Disposition of Italian and Japanese colonies will await conclusion of the war, although the San Francisco Conference may assign to the United States administrative control over the Pacific islands for which Japan was granted the mandate after World War I. Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, on April 5 urged that this country retain the Pacific Islands liberated by our forces.

MANDATE QUESTIONS POSTPONED AT DUMBARTON OAKS. Had representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China completed the task they originally set for themselves in the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, which ended October 7, 1944, they would have included in their proposals not 12 but 13 chapters. The 13th chapter was to have dealt with arrangements for transferring mandates, but the many weeks devoted to reaching agreement on proposals in the first 12 chapters discouraged the negotiators from prolonging the talks by consideration of this matter. Subsequently, hope developed that a special meeting on mandates might be held before April 25, but that prospect has faded. As a result, the San Francisco Conference will be asked to deal with this question, which President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin considered during their talks at Yalta.

The San Francisco resolution on mandates can be expected to substitute for "mandate" some word like "trusteeship," and to provide a more authoritative system of international supervision of trusteeships than that provided in Article 29 of the League Covenant. The League Mandates Commission was unable to combat directly either the discriminatory tax imposed in Southwest Africa in 1922 by the

Union of South Africa Administrator or the closed-door policy invoked by Japan for its mandates in the Pacific; also, it was forced to rely on reports from the mandatory governments for information respecting affairs in the mandates.

The new international organization may assume a responsibility which the League of Nations never had, that of devising a formula by which all colonial areas could, like the mandates, be led gradually toward independence. The general authority of the Assembly, as set forth in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which grants to it "the right . . . to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organization," covers colonial matters, but this government is said to consider it desirable that the Assembly be given a specific directive to discuss the colonial question.

LOT OF COLONIALS IMPROVED. In anticipation of a move for liberation of colonial possessions, the great powers have in recent years accelerated their programs for improving the social and political status of the dependent peoples. The British government has recently extended its Colonial Development and Welfare Act, first passed in 1940, and the Dutch announced in 1943 that overseas possessions would receive after the war a fuller autonomy than the Act of 1925 gave them. The French government on January 19, 1945 announced that after the war Indo-China, most important of the French colonies, would be autonomous.

The colonial powers, however, do not seem willing to go beyond granting dependent areas a larger measure of self-government. In all that concerns colonial policy, the struggle will be between the forces that favor true national freedom under international supervision and the forces that advocate nurturing colonial peoples for the status which we in the United States might describe as statehood. "It is imperative that the constitution which will determine the laws of the Fourth Republic must integrate our colonies into France," said René Pleven, then French Colonial Minister, on October 29, 1944. Colonel Oliver Stanley, British Colonial Secretary, stated in his address to the Foreign Policy Association on January 19, 1945 that the aim of Britain's colonial policy was the "achievement of the fullest possible measure of self-government within the Empire."

BLAIR BOLLES

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